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Bills to expand individual retirement accounts have been introduced in both houses of
Congress this year. While proponents argue that these accounts can help reverse the nation’s
declining saving rate, recent economic research suggests that the effect of the accounts on 
savings is in fact quite small.
In recent years, analysts have often charged Americans
with saving too little. As evidence, they cite the decline
in the net national saving rate from an average of 
8.4 percent of net national product (NNP) in the 1950s
and 1960s to 2.3 percent in the 1990s (Chart 1).1
Although the large government budget deficits of the
1980s and 1990s contributed to this decrease, lower
personal savings clearly played an important role. The
decline in the national saving rate troubles policymak-
ers for two reasons:  savings may be insufficient to
fund the investment necessary to raise living standards,
and workers may not be saving enough for their retirement. 
To arrest the decline in personal savings, many poli-
cymakers and economists have advocated expanding
targeted saving incentives such as individual retirement
accounts (IRAs). These accounts encourage saving by
exempting contributors from certain taxes typically
imposed on financial investments. The proponents of
these incentives believe that they would induce an
increase in personal savings well above any tax rev-
enue loss, thus boosting national savings. The influ-
ence of this view is evident in a number of bills recently
introduced in Congress that would expand IRAs.
Nevertheless, IRAs may not be as effective in
increasing savings as their proponents believe.
Although IRAs do encourage households to save by
increasing the after-tax rate of return for saving, this
higher return also means that households need to save
less to achieve the same retirement income goal.
Furthermore, because households receive a tax break
for their contributions to an IRA regardless of the
amount of new savings, households may shift assets
into the accounts without increasing their total savings.
Such a switch has no effect on net household savings
but reduces national savings by lowering tax revenue
and increasing the budget deficit.
The uncertainty about the impact of IRAs on sav-
ings has prompted many researchers to investigate the
topic. This article examines what we can learn from
existing studies about the effect of IRAs on savings.2
Although economists have reached conflicting conclu-
sions, the balance of evidence suggests that while IRAs
may increase savings in the long run, the impact would
probably be modest. Moreover, the current IRA pro-
posals are structured in such a way that they would
reduce any favorable impact on savings. We therefore
conclude that these proposals will not substantially
raise saving rates from their low levels.
History of IRAs and 401(k) Plans
IRAs were established in 1974 for workers not covered
by pension plans. Taxes on both the contributions and
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were withdrawn at retirement. Withdrawals before the
beneficiary reached 59 1/2 years of age were penalized.
Because IRAs were not widely promoted nor readily
available in the 1970s, however, few eligible taxpayers
contributed. Of the 51 percent of workers eligible to
contribute to IRAs in 1978, fewer than 3 percent did,
resulting in a mere $3 billion in contributions.
To encourage savings, the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 expanded IRA eligibility to almost every
working taxpayer. Contribution limits were raised from
$1,500 to $2,000 for single taxpayers, from $1,750 to
$2,250 for one-income joint filers, and to $4,000 for
two-income joint filers. Financial institutions
responded to the expanded market by promoting IRAs
more heavily. Correspondingly, contributions jumped
dramatically between 1981 and 1982 (Chart 2). But
although contributions remained high through 1986,
they were never more than 1 percent of GDP. Moreover,
the small fraction of eligible taxpayers who opened
IRAs were concentrated in upper income groups. For
example, only 17.8 percent of eligible tax returns in
1985 claimed an IRA deduction, but about three-
fourths of taxpayers with income above $75,000 did.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 curtailed the tax
deduction of IRA contributions for many workers.
Those covered by pension plans could deduct IRA con-
tributions fully only if their income was below $25,000
for single filers and $40,000 for joint filers; the deduc-
tion was fully phased out for single and joint filers with
incomes above $35,000 and $50,000, respectively.
Higher income earners could continue to make nonde-
ductible contributions and earn tax-deferred interest on
their accounts. These restrictions caused tax-deductible
contributions to fall 62 percent in 1987, and contribu-
tions since have continued to slip (Chart 2).
In 1978, another saving incentive similar to the IRA,
the 401(k) plan, was established. These plans did not
attract much interest until the early 1980s, after the
Treasury issued clarified rules on their tax advantages.
Like IRAs, 401(k) plans feature tax-deferral of contri-
butions and accrued interest, annual contribution lim-
its, and restrictions on early withdrawals. Some differ-
ences exist, however. Only workers of sponsoring
employers are eligible to contribute to 401(k) plans.
Contributions are made through payroll deductions and
can be matched by the employer, whereas IRA contri-
butions can be made at any time and have no provision
for employer matching. The annual contribution limit
for 401(k) plans, $9,240 in 1994, is much higher than
that for IRAs, although employers can impose addi-
tional limits on eligible contributions.
As Chart 2 indicates, 401(k) plans gained popularity
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in part as a supple-
ment to (or substitute for) employer-sponsored pension
plans. Although this increase has to some extent coun-
teracted the decline of IRAs, the total contribution to
targeted saving incentives as a percentage of GDP has
remained less than in 1986.
Current Proposals
Despite waning taxpayer interest in IRAs, many poli-
cymakers and economists still view the accounts as a
reliable vehicle for encouraging savings. As saving
rates have continued to fall in the 1990s, a number of
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contributions.We compare the incentives provided by front- and
back-loaded IRAs by means of an example (see
table). Suppose a taxpayer has $2,000 of before-tax
income in 1995 that is to be saved until retirement in
2010, and faces a constant 5 percent before-tax rate
of return and a constant 28 percent marginal tax rate.
If the taxpayer places the $2,000 in a taxable savings
account (column 1), he or she pays taxes on the
$2,000 (leaving $1,440 as the amount saved) and on
the yearly interest. The account then will grow to
$2,448 ($1,440×[1+(.05×[1-.28])]15) by 2010.
If this taxpayer contributes to a front-loaded IRA,
he or she will not pay any taxes on these funds until
they are withdrawn in 2010. After paying these taxes,
the contributor will have $2,994 to spend, $546 more
than if the funds were in a taxable account (column
2). This difference is the result of the preferential
treatment of the IRA. (It also represents the increase
in the government debt caused by the program.)
Because the gain is not realized until 2010, its present
value is $546/(1.05)15=$263 in 1995 dollars (last row).
If the taxpayer contributes to a back-loaded IRA
instead, he or she will have $2,994 ($1440×(1.05)15)
to spend in 2010, the same as under the front-loaded
IRA (column 3). Even though the taxpayer pays
taxes on the contribution in 1995, the amount paid is
the same in present value as the taxes paid at
withdrawal for a front-loaded IRA ($560 =
$1,164/(1.05)15).* The gain the taxpayer receives from 
a front- or back-loaded IRA comes from the tax-free
accrual of interest in the accounts, rather than from
the tax treatment of the contribution or withdrawal.
*Note that because contributions to back-loaded IRAs are
made with after-tax dollars, a $2,000 limit is more generous for
a back-loaded IRA than for a front-loaded IRA.
bills to expand IRAs have been proposed in Congress.
Separate bills have recently been introduced in the
House and the Senate, and the Clinton Administration
has put forth its own proposal. Although the proposals
differ in their details, they do share some common fea-
tures. First, to encourage more contributions, these pro-
posals would relax the penalties on early withdrawals
so that IRA holders could remove funds to pay for
higher education, a first home, or medical expenses.
Second, each of the proposals would establish a new
type of IRA. The contributions to these IRAs would not
be deductible, but the accumulated interest and
penalty-free withdrawals would be tax-free. This type
of IRA is described as “back loaded” because most of
the tax advantages are realized at the time of with-
drawal; the current IRAs are termed “front loaded”
because most of the tax advantages are realized at the
time of contribution. 
The back-loaded IRAs originated as a response to
near-term deficit concerns. The current desire in
A Comparison of Front- and Back-loaded IRAs
All Values in Dollars
Taxable  Front-loaded Back-loaded
Savings Account IRA IRA
Before-tax
income, 1995 2,000 2,000 2,000
Less: taxes
paid, 1995 560 0 560
Equals: amount
contributed to  _____ _____ _____
account, 1995 1,440 2,000 1,440
Accumulated
balance in 2010, 2,448 4,158 2,994
5% interest rate (28% tax) (tax-free) (tax-free)
Less: taxes
paid, 2010 0 1,164 0
Equals: after-tax _____ _____ _____
proceeds, 2010 2,448 2,994 2,994
Increase in 
government debt
from IRA, 2010 0 546 546
Present value
of cost, 1995 0 263 263
Source:  Hubbard and Skinner (1995, p. 12).
Washington is to balance the budget by about 2002,
and back-loaded IRAs appear to lose less revenue over
this time frame. However, such reasoning underesti-
mates the ultimate impact of back-loaded IRAs on the
government budget. In fact, if marginal tax rates and
interest rates are constant, the incentives that a tax-
payer receives from front- and back-loaded IRAs are
the same (see the box for a more detailed explanation).
Thus the ultimate impact of front- and back-loaded
IRAs on the government debt is identical under these
assumptions.
Moreover, even though the incentives created by the
two types of IRAs are equivalent under the stated con-
ditions, back-loaded IRAs may not generate the contri-
butions expected by their proponents. Because income
is likely to decline after retirement, most taxpayers’
marginal tax rates are expected to be lower at the time
of withdrawal than at the time of contribution. Thus,
many people will choose front-loaded over back-
loaded IRAs, reasoning that they will ultimately pay
less in taxes. In addition, taxpayers appear to value the
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immediate tax write-off from a front-loaded IRA, prob-
ably for the psychological satisfaction it affords.3
The Effect of IRAs on Savings
Some Ambiguities. The effect of IRAs on savings is
more ambiguous than many IRA proponents believe. It
depends on the interest rate elasticity of savings—that
is, the degree of response shown by savings to a given
change in the interest rate. This elasticity is influenced
by two counteracting forces. A higher after-tax interest
rate causes households to want to save more to become
wealthier in the future (the so-called substitution
effect), but the higher capital income in the present
encourages households to consume more and save less
(the income effect). Thus the magnitude of this elastic-
ity remains controversial and can only be determined
by studying actual data on the response of savings to
interest rate changes.4
A further complication arises in determining the
short-run, transitional effect of IRAs on savings.
Households will receive the tax break for their contri-
butions whether or not the contributions are new sav-
ings. During the initial years of an IRA program,
households may shift existing assets into the accounts
without increasing their saving. So even if the program
ultimately has a positive effect on savings, the short-
run effect could be reduced until households no longer
desire to shift assets into the accounts.
Short-Run Effect. Because IRAs have existed for a
relatively brief time, only their short-run effect on sav-
ings has been examined empirically. The table below
presents the results from several major studies. As the
table indicates, these studies have arrived at very dif-
ferent conclusions: some find a substantial effect, while
others find almost no effect.
These conflicting findings can be traced in part to
differences in the design of the studies. Besides a wide
variation in data sources, a key difference between
these studies is the choice of households whose saving
behavior is to be compared to identify the effect of
IRAs on savings. For example, Venti and Wise (1986,
1987, 1990, 1991) compare the savings of non-IRA
contributors and IRA contributors. In contrast, Gale and
Scholz (1994) compare households that contribute the
statutory IRA limit (limit contributors) with those that
contribute less than the limit (nonlimit contributors).
Both of these choices are problematic. Venti and
Wise’s observation that IRA contributors save more
than noncontributors does not necessarily mean that
IRAs have a strong effect on savings, because IRA con-
tributors are more likely to be high savers, even in the
absence of an IRA program. Gale and Scholz attempt to
circumvent this problem by identifying noncontributors
as low savers and effectively leaving them out of the
comparison. However, by comparing limit and nonlimit
contributors, they may underestimate the impact of
IRAs on saving. For example, in their model, past IRA
contributions help to identify a household as a high
saver. But evidence indicates that households that con-
tributed in the past usually continue to contribute. If
such a household made its original IRA contribution
because of the program’s incentives, its current IRA
Studies on the Short-Run Effect of IRAs on Savings
Author(s) and Date Data Source Key Results
Hubbard, 1984 1979 President’s Commission on Pension Policy Survey “Much of the contributed funds represent marginal saving”
Venti and Wise
1986 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances About 50% of contributions add to net national savings
1987 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances 45-55% of contributions add to net national savings
1990 1980-85 Consumer Expenditure Survey 65% of contributions add to net national savings
1991 1984-85 Survey of Income and Program Participation 66% of contributions add to net national savings
Feenberg and Skinner, 1989 1980-84 IRS/University of Michigan Taxpayer Panel IRAs cause only marginal reshuffling of assets
Attanasio and DeLeire, 1994 1982-91 Consumer Expenditure Survey Less than 20% of contributions add to net national savings
Gale and Scholz, 1994 1983 and 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances 2% of contributions add to net national savings
Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 1994 1979-88 IRS/University of Michigan Taxpayer Panel About 4% of contributions add to net national savings
Joines and Manegold, 1995 1979-86 IRS/University of Michigan Taxpayer Panel 19-26% of contributions add to net national savings
The balance of the evidence in the studies 
surveyed points to a relatively modest 
short-run effect of IRAs on savings.savings may be said to result from these incentives
rather than from its taste for saving.
Still, we believe that the balance of the evidence in
the studies surveyed points to a relatively modest
short-run effect of IRAs on savings. The most recent
studies listed in the table, which use data sources some-
what better suited for examining the issue than those
used in earlier work, indicate that one-quarter or less of
IRA contributions add to net national savings.
Moreover, even if the higher estimates of Venti and
Wise were correct, the effect of IRAs on aggregate sav-
ings would be modest because IRA contributions have
been a small fraction of NNP. During the peak years of
IRAs (1982-86), contributions were slightly more than
1 percent of NNP. The Venti and Wise estimates then
imply that IRAs during this period would have raised
the net national saving rate 0.7 percentage points at
most, a small increase compared with the 3.6 percent-
age point decline in the average net national saving rate
between the 1970s and 1980s (see Chart 1).
Long-Run Effect. Because data on the ultimate effect
of IRAs are not available, economists must turn to arti-
ficial simulation models to study the long-run effect.
Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) develop a life-cycle
model that incorporates many important features of
current IRAs and 401(k) plans:  tax-deductible contri-
butions, annual limits on contributions, and early with-
drawal penalties.
Their simulations indicate that the ultimate effect of
these plans is likely to be fairly small even though the
interest rate elasticity in the model is sizable.5 IRAs
eventually would increase net national savings about 
3 percent if the contribution limit is $2,000, and about
5 percent if the limit is $4,000. The 401(k) plans,
which provide greater incentives, would increase net
national savings about 8 percent if a 100 percent
penalty is placed on early withdrawals, and about 17
percent if a 10 percent penalty is placed on early with-
drawals.6 Consequently, if the initial national saving
rate is 6 percent (which is close to the initial saving rate
in the model and consistent with the post-World War II
average), an IRA program would eventually raise the
saving rate to 6.3 percent at most, and a 401(k) plan
would raise it to 7 percent at most. 
Even though the tax incentive programs show only a
modest effect on the saving rate, the model appears to
suggest a substantial cumulative impact on the capital
stock—the amount of funds available to be invested by
firms. Hubbard and Skinner (1995) calculate that the
most effective IRA and 401(k) plans studied by Engen,
Gale, and Scholz would eventually increase the capital
stock $4 and $16, respectively, for every dollar
increase in the government debt. However, this calcu-
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lation probably exaggerates the effect of these plans.
The national assets-to-income ratio in the model ini-
tially falls because the larger government budget
deficit overwhelms higher private savings. It then takes
thirty-five to fifty years before this ratio returns to its
original level, and the ultimate effect is not reached
until after seventy years. Over this entire period, many
variables in the model, such as interest rates, are
assumed to remain constant. If the model is modified to
allow these variables to change over time, the long-run
effect on the capital stock is considerably smaller.7
Conclusion
What does the research surveyed in this article imply
about the current proposals to expand IRAs? We
believe that the proposals will probably be even less
effective in generating savings than the current pro-
grams—front-loaded IRAs and 401(k)s—for several
reasons. First, the back-loaded IRAs in these proposals
are unlikely to increase contributions substantially
because taxpayers appear to prefer an immediate tax
write-off. Second, the proposals lack the employer
matching provisions that help make 401(k) plans more
effective in generating savings. Third, even though the
relaxed withdrawal provisions may encourage more
contributions at the outset, this effect would probably
be offset by greater asset-shifting in the short run and
by more withdrawals in the long run.
As for IRAs in general, the short-run effect of these
accounts on savings is difficult to establish, but any
increase in savings is likely to be extremely modest.
An IRA program maintained over the long term is also
likely to have a small impact, although it might
increase savings at the margin. In sum, such programs
by themselves are probably insufficient to reverse the
recent decline in the saving rate. Thus, a major turn-
around in the national saving rate will require much
more ambitious initiatives:  a total overhaul of the tax
system to favor all savings, a large-scale effort to
reduce the budget deficit, or a significant change in
household attitudes toward saving.
Notes
1. The net national saving rate is calculated using data from the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). It is gross saving
minus depreciation, all divided by net national product.
2. Other recent surveys include Gravelle (1991) and Hubbard and
Skinner (1995).
3. Feenberg and Skinner (1989) provide some evidence on such
behavior. They find that a predictor of IRA contributions is whether
a taxpayer would owe money on his or her return. They interpret
this finding to mean that taxpayers prefer opening an IRA to paying
the Internal Revenue Service.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
4. For example, Boskin (1978) estimates that savings would
increase by 0.4 percent for each 1 percent increase in interest rates.
In contrast to Boskin’s figure, which is at the upper bound of empir-
ical estimates, Hall (1988) calculates an elasticity of close to zero.
Steindel (1981) explains that such calculations can differ greatly
because the elasticity depends on both the consumption function
and the relative responses of property income and wealth to a
change in the interest rate.
5. The implied (uncompensated) interest rate elasticity of savings in
the model is between 0.15 and 0.35, compared with the largest esti-
mates of about 0.4 (see preceding note).
6. Under current law, allowable early withdrawals are penalized at
a 10 percent rate. However, early withdrawals are allowed only in
certain circumstances, such as employee separation from a firm and
“financial hardship,” so that the effective penalty rate is between 
10 and 100 percent.
7. For example, as the capital stock increased in later periods, inter-
est rates would probably fall. This effect would reduce the increase
in the capital stock. In the extreme, a simple general equilibrium
model such as the Solow growth model would imply a constant
steady state capital-to-income ratio. An IRA plan then would have
no effect on the capital stock in the long run.
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